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A Foreign Commission for Domestic Needs: The 
Constitutional Founding of Malaysia 
H KUMARASINGHAM 
Introduction 
‘The calibre of the Commission will have to be very high, since the problems will be unusual 
and of great complexity’.1 Thus stated the last British colonial High Commissioner in Malaya, 
Sir Donald McGillivray, when assessing the needs and demands a constitutional commission 
would be tasked with drawing up the constitutional foundations for an independent Malaysia. 
The constitutional founding of Malaysia is one of the more unique in British and Imperial 
constitutional history and McGillivray was not exaggerating in describing the situation as 
‘unusual’. Not only was this the first major transfer of power in British Asia since the end of 
the Indian Empire a decade before, but it also confronted the constitution-makers with a 
complex polity enmeshed in rebellion, racial divisions, peculiar legal relations with Britain, 
esoteric governing structures, indigenous rulers with varying privileges, precarious geo-
political position and pronounced religious and ethnic sensitivities. Far from being a dry, pro 
forma and incidental body, the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, better known 
as the Reid Commission, and its Report, were unquestionably critical and conspicuous in the 
constitutional founding of independent Malaysia. While it would be another eight years before 
modern Malaysia would appear – with the incorporation of North Borneo and Sarawak, and 
the exclusion of Singapore – the Reid Commission’s report laid the constitutional foundation 
for Malaysia when published in 1957. This chapter examines the constitutional context that led 
to the founding of independent Malaya. Malaya stands out in British colonial constitutional 
                                                 
1  AJ Stockwell (ed), British Documents on the End of Empire – Malaya, Pt III – The Alliance Route to 
Independence, 1953–1957, Series B, vol 3 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1995) at 227 
[hereinafter ‘BDEEP’]. 
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history as one of the most complex and unique constitutional founding moments, let alone in 
Southeast Asia.  
The leading local actors were the indigenous rulers across the Federation jealous of 
their prerogatives and a pragmatic coalition between the major communal parties: United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the 
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). Despite this, Malaya sought an entirely non-local 
Commission to establish the constitutional identity for an independent state. As Lauren Benton 
and Lisa Ford noted in their work on international law and the nineteenth century British 
Empire, colonial commissions of inquiry have been largely eschewed by academics and have 
thus become a ‘grossly understudied constitutional moment’.2 This essentially remains the case 
for the following century when the Southeast Asian states’ constitutions covered in this volume 
were framed. The Reid Commission provides for Malaysia this critical ‘constitutional moment’ 
that ushered in the constitutional character and complexion of the country. 
I Malayan Context 
The Malay Archipelago since early times has been a region of deeply rooted governing 
traditions and experience of diversity in every sense. Melaka, especially, became the centre of 
the Malay world and had a rich cosmopolitan culture and a flourishing trading network and 
historically controlled most of the modern Malaysian peninsular and islands. The Sultanate of 
Melaka, as a commercial and cultural entrepôt, attracted significant migration not just from the 
Malay world, but also from across Asia. When the Sultanate fell to the Portuguese in 1511 the 
centre of the Malay world may have been lost, but its example, even if romanticised, remained 
as a template of kingship and governance. The Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals, though 
written well after the fall of Melaka details a founding story of Malay kingship that successor 
regimes, both colonial and local, would try and emulate. As Harper states, they served as a 
‘source of instruction’ and ‘enshrined the sanctity and authority, the daulat, of the Ruler’, 
which in turn help give cohesiveness to the state and foster Malay nationalist thought and their 
                                                 
2  Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order – The British Empire and the Origins of International Law 
1800-1850 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016) at 59. 
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authority and fitness in government.3 This narrative remains critical to traditional authority in 
contemporary Malaysia and was openly prominent in the foundation of the state when Rulers’ 
position and prerogatives were at the forefront of debate. European colonialism did not 
dismantle traditional rule. Instead, as will be discussed further below, the British were in favour 
of keeping traditional Malay governance roles and styles in place. As Harper argues ‘the 
hallmark of colonial rule was the reinvention of traditional forms’.4 Unlike some other 
traditional societies affected by colonialism the local Malay rulers largely not only retained 
their position, but also their influence on their subject culturally and constitutionally. However, 
while the Sultans were accepted as sovereign rulers, they had to admit – through a series of 
treaties – an on-the-spot British resident who had substantial powers. This was formalised in 
the 1874 Pangkor agreements that ensured British indirect rule in the Malay states. The Straits 
Settlements, which did not have Rulers, was administered directly by the British. Nonetheless 
Malay culture and practices permeated throughout. Even before it was formalised in 1957, the 
Malayan polity and constitutional culture contained what former Lord President of the Supreme 
Court, Salleh bin Abas, described as ‘traditional elements’: (a) the Sultanate or Rulership; (b) 
the Islamic religion; (c) the Malay language; and (d) Malay privileges.5 The need for such 
constitutional and cultural considerations in the Malaysian founding was due to major 
demographic changes, the Malays were far from being the only community in the archipelago 
and sought protection of their status.  
Migration caused a tremendous impact upon the composition of Malaya that would 
consequently affect the political bargaining surrounding the state’s constitutional foundation. 
Colonialism accelerated the migration of various communities to the region. In particular, 
Chinese and Indian immigrants came to Malaya particularly from the nineteenth century as the 
British encouraged labourers specially to work on the plantations that were critical to the 
region’s substantial commercial contribution to the imperial economy. The growth in economic 
                                                 
3  TN Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
at 15 [hereinafter ‘Harper’]. 
4  Ibid at 19. 
5  Mohd Salleh bin Abas, ‘Traditional Elements of the Malaysian Constitution’ in FA Trindade and HP Lee 
(eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and Developments – Essays in Honour of Tun 
Mohamed Suffian (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986) 1–17. 
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power of non-Malays and formation of political groups based on identity made many Malays 
fear for their position. So many of the colonial era confrontations were associated with tensions 
and violence between the Malays and non-Malays. The Malays were fearful of the growing 
permanence of the Chinese and Indian communities. While all had originally seen the migrant 
labour as being temporary, greater settlement in fact occurred due to economic and geopolitical 
reasons. In 1947 over 60 per cent of the so-called ‘immigrants’ had actually been born in 
Malaya.6 This had major repercussions. With little inclination or capability of moving, this 
large non-Malay population would seek not only rights for their respective communities, but 
also participation and recognition in the foundation of the state.   
II Colonial and Constitutional Precursors  
The founding of independent Malaya could have gone very differently. As the Japanese 
Occupation drew to its close, there were many ideas from Malays like Ibrahim Yaacob and 
Mustapha Hussain to craft a Malay constitutional polity before the British restored colonial 
rule. There was even vigorous support from certain Malay quarters to join an ‘Indonesia Raya’ 
or Greater Indonesia under Sukarno’s leadership of this pan-Muslim Southeast Asian creation. 
As the Japanese surrendered on 15 August 1945, plans were also afoot to announce a Malayan 
Democratic Republic with the Sultan Abdul Aziz of Pahang as its figurehead. However, 
Sukarno went ahead with Indonesian plans that did not include Malaya and British colonial 
rule re-emerged that scuppered these alternate ideas for Malaya’s constitutional founding.7 
Instead the British, in a secret planning session in Wimbledon, which CA Bayly and Tim 
Harper label one of the most thorough colonial documents for future constitutional reform in 
the Empire8, prepared the way for a Malayan Union, which would be more centralised and 
uniform than had been the case previously.  
                                                 
6  Harper (n 3), at 41. 
7  Christopher Bayly & Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia 1941-1945 (London: Allen 
Lane, 2004), at 453–455. 
8  Ibid.  
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Sir Harold MacMichael, fresh from Palestine, was the His Majesty’s Government’s 
Special Representative in 1944. He determined that his mission would modernise governance 
in Malaya, and this involved each traditional ruler effectively surrendering his powers to the 
British Crown and then being offered direct and centralised British rule. Rather than help 
facilitate the path to self-government, MacMichael’s strategy had the effect of alienating the 
Rulers as traditional allies and giving a spur to Malay and Malayan nationalism and this 
seeming reinvigorated attempt in British imperialism.9 Sir Edward Gent, the first Governor of 
the Malayan Union, decided that the constitutional path lay in conciliation with Malayan 
interests rather than in diminishing them, especially considering their need of allies against the 
Malayan Communists. Nonetheless the Rulers were not appeased and boycotted his installation 
as Union Governor while senior Malay politician Dato Onn Jaafar and others in consequence 
of the so-called MacMichael treaties, formed the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO) in May 1946. That same month, Malcolm MacDonald was sworn in as Governor-
General of Southeast Asia and made immediate overtures to the Rulers and Dato Onn to restore 
the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers and eventually create the Federation of Malaya in 1948.  
As MacDonald reported to the Secretary of State, Malay opposition was not just from 
the Rulers, but ‘comes strongly from Malayan democratic opinion as a whole’.10 Malayan 
constitutional consciousness was very alive. New parties emerged and eventually, and 
crucially, Tunku Abdul Rahman took over the UMNO leadership in 1951 from Dato Onn who 
left to form his own party that same year. Both of these distinguished Malays hailed from 
aristocratic backgrounds. The Tunku’s father was Sultan of Kedah while Dato Onn came from 
a long line of high officials in Johore. Dato Onn was the more complex and intellectual of the 
two. He had thought deeply about Malays and their place in a new Malaya. At times he could 
be pro-monarchy and an eloquent proponent of Malay nationalism while at other turned a fierce 
critic of the Sultans and prophet of the need to abolish communal feels and craft a united 
Malayan identity drawn from all communities. He also advocated that UMNO be open to non-
Malays. The rejection of this idea caused him to leave the party. He also, unfashionably, was 
                                                 
9  Appointment of Special Commissioner in SE Asia, 13 Feb 1946, CAB 21/1954 and Local Reactions to the 
White Paper, 23 Feb 1946, CO 537/1581, BDEEP (n 1), vol 1, docs 71 and 72.  
10  Clyde Sanger, Malcom MacDonald – Bringing an End to Empire (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1995), at 273–276. 
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not convinced by the demand for independence. Between 1945 and 1948 he repeatedly said 
belum layak (not yet ready) demonstrating his anxieties over the constitutional and political 
direction the Federation was heading.11 His views also caused consternation with the Rulers, 
particularly with the Sultan Ibrahim of the State of Johore where he served on multiple 
occasions as Chief Minister. The Rulers effectively scuttled a British proposal to have a Malay 
as deputy high commissioner who most likely would have been Onn. Telling the UMNO youth 
wing in August 1949 that ‘the days of feudal rule are over’ and that we ‘are in the age of 
democratic and constitutional rule’ was unlikely to find favour with the Malay monarchs some 
of whom had already expressed contempt for the idea of popular democracy and elections.12 
While wanting to promote the Malays he also strived to broaden the movement to reach out to 
the non-Malays. As Bayly and Harper argue, Onn was moving too far ahead of Malay 
opinion.13 These points and others caused him to split from UMNO and leave its leadership to 
the more relaxed Cambridge-educated Tunku who not only was more sensitive to the position 
of the Rulers, but accepted the special place of Malays in any constitutional structure albeit 
while in alliance with the other communities. 
 Many from the British side sought to dampen expectations of rapid self-government. 
Lord Killearn, Special Commissioner to South East-Asia since 1946, believed too much had 
been determined by the need to provide a regulation map for the path to independence. This, 
he argued, only made local ‘irresponsibles’ think that constitutional advancement was ‘the 
panacea for all ills’. A few years later in 1949 officials in the Foreign and Colonial Offices 
believed that Malaya could only expect self-government in up to 20 years and not the eight that 
eventually occurred.14 Nonetheless, Labour ministers like James Griffiths and John Strachey 
and their Conservative successors like Oliver Lyttelton and Alan Lennox-Boyd came to see the 
lessons from India and the need to ensure a swifter and more co-operative style self-
government to maintain not only peace and order, but also protect British interests through 
                                                 
11  BDEEP (n 1), Pt I, at lxxix. 
12  Joseph M Fernando, The Making of the Malayan Constitution (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 2002), at 12. 
13  Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars – The End of Britain’s Asian Empire (London: Penguin, 
2007), at 502. 
14  Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945-1963 – Scrutinising the Official Mind, 
(London: Routledge, 2002), at 51–53. 
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cooperation with a local leadership they could work with, as opposed to the potential of a 
Communist or Nationalist regime who would surely break down crucial defence and economic 
edifices that Britain relied upon.15 Malaya accounted in 1951 for just under 10 per cent of 
Britain’s world exports and a valuable defence pivot in its Asian ambitions.16 For the traditional 
Malay leadership there was also interest to maintain good relations since the very Communists 
and Nationalists the British wanted excluded were also keen to throw off the feudal government 
and society of the region, which the British had enabled, and replace with ‘true democracy’. 
The Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (or PUTERA) sought the end of class and communal division 
and instead the unity of all Malayans. 
The People’s Constitution of PUTERA is based on election, kedaulatan rakyat [sovereignty of 
the people], and moves towards social justice, and egalitarianism, without upper and lower 
classes in the bangsa [nation] except according to the capability, intelligence and industry of 
the individual. We hope in this matter the rakyat no longer have any doubts, but instead have 
more faith in the struggle and loyalty to their respective movements. Because of this we 
appeal once more, struggle onwards with a fiery spirit, but cool head until the sacred aims that 
we aspire to are achieved. Remember, comrades, that the world is changing fast and we 
cannot live with the understandings and feelings that we had in the year 1941. We are now in 
the year 1947 in the atomic age, the old era has passed.17  
The All-Malayan Council of Joint Action founded in 1946–47 which brought together 
Malay radicals, Chinese Kuomintang, Communists, Leftists, Businessmen, Englishmen and 
others proposed a ‘People’s Constitution’. For many in this disparate group the goal was to 
create a constitution founded on common citizenship, but without individual conformity and 
to wrest power away from the British and their interlocutors in the Malay leadership. The 
British and UMNO under the Tunku largely ignored this constitutional populism and the 
organisation became riddled with division and was unable to provide a realistic constitutional 
alternative for a sovereign Malaya.18  
The Tunku’s UMNO eventually joined with the MCA in 1952 and later the MIC to form 
the Alliance party to contest elections and demonstrate inter-communal cooperation. The 
                                                 
15  See, eg, Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire – The Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 156–160 and 198–201.  
16  Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars (n 13), at 408. 
17  Ibid, at 517. 
18  Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars (n 13), at 361–371 
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British had made it clear, perhaps with a mind to other parts of Asia, that political cooperation 
and accommodation between the three main communities was a necessity to achieve 
independence.19 The Alliance fitted this requirement and its ethnic components, by and large 
proved practical and sensitive to their separate needs, while keeping the common goal of 
merdeka to the fore. The 1955 federal elections were the first real test for this constitutional 
concert party. The level of success of the Alliance coalition in the 1955 general elections 
surprised even the Tunku. The Alliance won every single elected seat except in Krian, Perak, 
– which was almost entirely populated by Malays – went to the Pan Malayan Islamic Party. 
The Alliance’s great rival Dato Onn and his Party Negara were prevented from providing any 
opposition to the Alliance vision since they were unable to gain any representation in the 
legislature. With 51 of the 52 elected seats, the Straits Times, previously a critic, predicted that 
the Alliance’s victory ‘probably unparalleled outside the totalitarian countries’ will allay 
‘doubts and fears’ and produce ‘a wholesome effect in that a strong, stable government can be 
formed, which can be sustained solely by its electoral strength’.20 A point that would clearly 
reinforce the Tunku’s independence objectives. The victory also served to achieve, electorally 
at the least, evidence of cooperation among the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities, which 
was a critical condition for the British to transfer power. Though, as with all elections, the 
results could be deceiving. Malays constituted 84 per cent of eligible voters despite their 
population being nowhere near that amount numerically in the Federation. The Chinese for 
example while comprising about 40 per cent of the population only made up 11 per cent of 
eligible voters of which only an estimated eighth voted. Only 5 per cent of registered voters 
were Indian. Nonetheless the Alliance came away with 79.6 per cent of the popular vote.21 
The British and Malayan leadership resolved early in 1956 at the London conference that 
‘self-government and independence within the Commonwealth should be proclaimed by 
                                                 
19  Fernando, Making (n 12), at 37. 
20  Joseph M Fernando, The Alliance Road to Independence (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malays Press, 2009) 
at 101. 
21  Francis G Carnell, ‘The Malayan Elections’ (1955) 28(4) Pacific Affairs 316. 
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August 1957, if possible’.22 As Stockwell recounts the constitutional and political hurdles to 
surmount in just over a year from those talks were formidable to forge an independent state. 
The mass of business to complete before that included the following: drawing up the 
independence constitution and defining citizenship and nationality; negotiating the defence 
agreement; working out financial provisions; settling the peculiar problems of Penang and 
Malacca; reaching a decision on the question of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council; reaching terms for expatriates, pushing ahead with Malayanisation and establishing 
the public services commission; selecting Malaya’s head of state and designating Malayan 
governors for Penang and Malacca; submitting an application for Commonwealth 
membership; and preparing for independence celebrations. The pace of business was 
breathtaking.23  
To this bewildering array of issues and objectives Stockwell adds that with such needs 
in so short a time there was, inevitably, ‘controversy, tension and dispute’.24 To this context 
arrived a constitutional commission full of ethnic diversity, legal expertise, jurisdictional 
breadth, and slight, if any, knowledge of the country they were tasked to prepare a constitution 
for. 
III Constitutional Commission 
Less than a month after his landslide victory, the Tunku wrote to Lennox-Boyd arguing the 
need for the appointment of a constitutional commission whose overseas members would come 
‘preferably from the Commonwealth countries’. The Tunku then outlined the some of his 
reasons. 
In our opinion, only such a Commission would be able to exercise complete impartiality in the 
inquiry into the Constitution. We feel confident that the Commission composed of members, 
rich in experience of constitutional and political matters, would be able to bring a fresh 
approach to the problems of our country. They would be able to produce an unbiased report on 
the constitutional reforms which will fit this country for full responsible self-government and 
independence in the shortest time possible.25 
The Alliance had said as much in their 1955 election manifesto. This would be mean 
that unlike India Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Ghana, all recent cases of states that had gained 
                                                 
22  Report by the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Conference, Cmnd 9174, London: 1956. 
23   
24  BDEEP (n 1), s Pt I, p lxxvii. 
25  Ibid, Pt III, p 154. 
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independence from Britain, the Alliance preferred to wholly place their constitution framing in 
the Commission composed entirely of those drawn from outside their land. The Rulers did not 
initially share the Alliance’s opinion as they expressed preferment for a Malayan body with 
possibly a British chair.26 
The Alliance had already contacted the governments of Australia and Canada about their 
participation in the Commission; even outlining the possibility of an Australian chair.27 In 
Britain various names were mentioned for two members from Britain, one of whom would be 
the chair. The Colonial Office originally wanted the former Lord Chancellor, Lord Simonds, 
but eventually the former Solicitor-General for Scotland and Lord Advocate, Lord Reid, was 
selected. Australian justice Michael Kirby, in an analysis of 50 years of Malaysia’s 
Constitution, said that Reid was ‘one of the greatest jurists of the century in the English-
speaking world’.28 Sir Kenneth Wheare and Nicholas Mansergh, Commonwealth constitutional 
scholars in Oxford and Cambridge respectively, were considered, but eventually the Tunku’s 
old friend from his days as a student in St Catharine’s, Cambridge, Sir Ivor Jennings, was 
selected in spite of certain Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Office opposition to a man 
who had long troubled them since his days in Ceylon.29 Australia drew many different names, 
but in the end Robert Menzies recommended his former political rival Sir William McKell to 
the Commission.30 The former boilermaker and Australian governor-general had served as 
Labour premier of New South Wales who had trained as a barrister. Canada’s nomination fell 
through due to personal circumstances and was not replaced.31 India provided Bidhubusan 
                                                 
26  Fernando (n 12), at 103. 
27  Ibid, at 104. 
28  Kirby quoted in HP Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), at viii. 
29  H Kumarasingham (ed), ‘Introduction’, Constitution-Maker – Selected Writings of Sir Ivor Jennings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
30  Australian legal experts that were discussed to be on the Reid Commission included the Solicitor-General 
Sir Kenneth Bailey, law professor Zelman Cowen, and judges Sir John Latham, Sir Owen Dixon, Sir Alan 
Taylor, Sir Wilfred Fullagar, Sir Ned Herring, and Sir Reginald Sholl. 
31  Kumarasingham (n 29). 
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Malik, a former Chief Justice of Allahabad. Pakistan recommended Justice Abdul Hamid who 
had once served as Secretary to the Law Ministry in West Pakistan, and who knew Jennings 
from his time advising in Karachi. Upon hearing of Hamid’s appointment, Jennings wrote to 
the Colonial Office official Sir john Martin:  
I am glad that Pakistan has at last appointed Abdul Hamid: indeed, it is not easy to understand 
why it took so long. He is a cautious and precise lawyer, a little conservative and sometimes 
very obstinate. He can draft but not write. His great advantage, for present purposes, is that his 
only grievance against H[er] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] is that it walked out in 1947. Like 
many of the Pathans, he prefers the Queen-Empress to the Punjabi politicians. I hope India 
does us equally well, though since Hamid is a very orthodox Muslim it would be best to have 
a Hindu—two Muslims might frighten the Chinese.32 
The Terms of Reference for the commission provided key institutional and political 
parameters that shaped the intentions and realities of Malaysia’s constitutional independence. 
To examine the present constitutional arrangements throughout the Federation of Malaya, 
taking into account the positions and dignities of Her Majesty The Queen and of Their 
Highnesses the Rulers: and To make recommendations for a federal form of constitution for 
the whole country as a single, self-governing unit within the Commonwealth based on 
Parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature, which would include provision for: (i) 
the establishment of a strong central government with the States and Settlements enjoying a 
measure of autonomy (the question of the residual legislative power to be examined by, and to 
the subject of recommendations by the Commission) and with machinery for consultation 
between the central Government and the States and Settlements on certain financial matters to 
be specified in the Constitution; (ii) the safeguarding of the position and prestige of Their 
Highnesses as constitutional Rulers of their respective States; (iii) a constitutional Yang di-
Pertuan Besar (Head of State) for the Federation to be chosen from among Their Highnesses 
the Rulers; (iv) a common nationality for the whole of the Federation; (v) the safeguarding of 
the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities. 33 
As the above indicates and along with the discussions emanating from the London 
Conference previously, the Commission’s objectives were relatively clear. As Harding argues 
‘Its task was perceived therefore not so much as a political exercise as the translation into legal 
and practical terms of that which was already politically settled’. As such the members were 
chosen for their political and constitutional expertise instead of experience of Malaya, which 
with the exception of Jennings’ university work there, was almost entirely absent.34  
                                                 
32  Jennings to Martin, 1 June 1956, CO 1030/130. 
33  The Colonial Office, Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, no. 330 (Reid 
Report). 
34  Andrew Harding, The Constitution of Malaysia – A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart, 2012) p 31. 
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Another side to the unusual nature of having a Commonwealth constitutional commission 
without local participation is that Malaya did not feel the need to follow the precedent of India 
or Pakistan a decade earlier and convene a constituent assembly for local representatives to 
debate, research and prepare a constitution. Andrew Harding believes this constitutional 
evasion was a mistake. 
Although this enabled independence to be reached probably sooner than otherwise have been 
possible, and although the Commission consulted widely and sympathetically and the Reid 
Constitution was accepted by all the relevant institutions in Malaya, the Malaysian 
Constitution has probably suffered from the fact that it was not drafted by the representatives 
of the people. It has often been seen or presented as a foreign document rather than an 
indigenous one. A more democratically chosen body would, undoubtedly, have come up with 
radically different recommendations.35 
This perspective opens the charge that the constitution was not, in KC Wheare’s famous 
characterisation autochthonous, ‘sprung from the land itself’.36 However, the involvement, 
preferment and sanction of the Alliance, drawing as they did from not only a massive legislative 
dominance, but also representing the three main communities of Malaya with the active 
distinction that the Commission formally derived its authority from the Malay Rulers (as well 
as the Queen) did illustrate not insubstantial indigenous influence and conditions in its creation 
and context. Whatever else, as Sir David Watherspoon, Chief Secretary of Malaya put it, the 
Commission’s actions and plans seemed to ‘be singularly fluid’.37 
IV Commission Deliberations  
The Commission held 118 meetings and considered 131 memoranda and took evidence from 
diverse groups and individuals across the breadth of Malaya. Nonetheless the style and saunter 
of the Commission raised questions. Lord Reid and his wife, ‘the eminence grise’, as Jennings 
called her, did not always endear themselves to the Commissioners with Lady Reid’s insistence 
on remorseless protocol and leisurely pace of travel and work. As Jennings remarked ‘What 
the deuce is the good of our sitting in our chalets reading papers, when the Malayans are all 
                                                 
35  Andrew Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia (London: Kluwer Law International, 
1996), at 29. 
36  KC Wheare, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 
p 89. 
37  CO 1030/132, 3 August 1956. 
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around us?’38 Reid, Hamid and Jennings in particular were the most influential members of the 
Commission with Jennings alone preparing most of the working papers on subjects such as 
federal-state relations, elections, the monarchy and economic development.39 He was also often 
caustic about the deficiencies of his fellow members – at one point commenting that Reid was 
‘using the tricks of a small-town lawyer’ or that ‘There is no doubt that Malik is out of his 
intellectual environment. He is rather a stupid fellow, third class in ability and fourth in 
imagination’ while McKell was out ‘lunching with Australians’.40 Occasionally, however, 
Jennings recognised the value of the Commonwealth crew. 
Lord Reid himself has done a lot of work on the drafts and his criticisms are always acute. He 
is unfortunately prejudiced by an emotional sympathy with the Rulers; but he might not 
unreasonably complain that McKell and I have an emotional antipathy to the Rulers. I must 
confess that I have no very high opinion [of] Tunkus, except Abdul Rahman, who is 
noteworthy for his plain common sense. On these matters McKell supports me and I support 
him. Nevertheless, Lord Reid has been a most effective critic of my drafts, which have 
generally been improved by him. His draft Report, too, is very sensible, and I have not found 
much in it to criticise – though I have not done very much on the Report, because my main job 
has been to produce the Draft Constitution.41 
The real tension, however, was between Justice Hamid and the others. Hamid saw himself 
as a defender of the Malays and protector of their faith. Hamid argued to his fellow 
Commissioners: 
The new Constitution confers citizenship rights on a very large number of non-Malays and in 
the course of a very short time non-Malays will outnumber the Malays on the electoral roll 
and will be in majority in the legislature. The protection which a majority in a legislature 
enjoys will not be available to them for long.42  
He wanted stronger wording of the already agreed provisions for Malays including the 
provision of 15 years of protection be extended indefinitely and that the Yang di-Pertuan Besar 
as head of state have discretionary responsibility to safeguard the privileges of Malays, 
especially if future demographics placed the Malay people as a minority within the legislature. 
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The Commission members mostly recoiled at this proposal since many saw that this could 
transform a constitutional head of state into something more powerful and one that could act 
without advice or support from the government.43 The Commission members were particularly 
incensed that Hamid was returning to issues that not only had they thought settled, but in many 
cases, such as Articles 82 and 157, where Hamid had actually drafted the special position of 
Malays. Jennings eventually had a showdown with Hamid. 
At dinner I told Hamid that I was going to draft a violent attack on him as our draft reply to 
his Note, and that I was going to do it in defence of the people of Malaya, of the Federation 
Government, and in particular of my friend Tunku Abdul Rahman…This morning at 9.30 a.m. 
(2nd Feb) Hamid said that he saw the force of my argument. If anything said by him were to 
prevent the people of Malaya from living and working together as a band of brothers he would 
be a very great sinner. He wanted to do everything he could to help, but he feared that it might 
not work, so he wanted some protection for the Malays, who have been very generous and 
deserved protection… I then asked Hamid if he was prepared to risk a riot by inserting all this 
political dynamite merely for a few quotas. Lord Reid broke in and said: “Hamid, do you 
realise that if this goes in, the blood of thousands of people may be on your hands? Will you 
not remove all this and merely express your dissent on Quotas on the simple basis that you do 
not think the protection goes far enough?”44 
Hamid was able to include his note of dissent, but largely the issue of the Malay special 
position was settled by the Alliance when they had a chance to respond to the report. The Tunku 
was able to ensure through his personal sincerity and relationships with the MCA and MIC 
leadership compromises that upheld the special Malay position with clear undertaking that their 
languages and schools could continue to operate. 
Interestingly the Assistant Secretary to the Commission, K J Henderson, believed that 
personal dynamics rather than pure intellectual differences had bedevilled the Commission’s 
outcome and unfortunate dissent. It was reported to the Colonial Office that ‘The Commission's 
report reflects the disharmony which prevailed throughout, and which I think we cannot but 
ascribe to the absence of real leadership. I think we must be profoundly grateful that the report 
is as good as it is’.45 The minute continued that it was Henderson’s impression that: 
the Commission had finished up completely at loggerheads with each other, largely because of 
the extraordinary behaviour of the Reids who had set an example of self-concern and had been 
utterly and consistently inconsiderate not only of the staff of the Commission but of the other 
members. Mr. Henderson was quite certain that Mr. Justice Hamid's insistence at the last 
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minute on producing a minority report was little more than an attempt to assert himself after 
his opinions and views had been consistently brushed aside by Lord Reid during the 
Commission's time in Malaya. The rudeness with which the Reids visited almost everyone 
with whom they came in contact is scarcely credible.46 
 V Ruling and Reigning  
In many ways, the Reid Commission’s report not merely preserved, but enhanced the status 
and powers of the Malay Rulers. As such the power of people and power of the Rulers at 
independence arguably muddied a clear sense of who truly safeguarded the representation of 
Malays. Were the Rulers with their religious and cultural significance the traditional defenders 
of the Malay people or was it the newly elected government with electoral backing? The Reid 
Commission and the independence settlement, as Simon C Smith contends, by ‘consolidating 
the position of the Rulers…ensured that the issue of where sovereignty resides has remained 
contentious’ ever since.47 Some submissions to the Commission were deeply concerned about 
the potential for Sultanic aggrandisement that might arise with the entrenchment of the Rulers 
into the Constitution. The Labour Party of Malaya, which contained Chinese and Indians, for 
example, believed that the Alliance as the ‘Party of Privilege’ had by ‘skilful propaganda’ 
convinced the Malays that their own fortunes were identical to the Malay Royals. Labour 
therefore believed that in deference to the Malays the Sultans would be able to become 
constitutional monarchs, but on their death, a ‘referendum’ would occur among the entire 
population to gauge whether the monarchy should remain. Even more radically they believed 
the country should have a head of state elected from the federal and state legislatures called a 
President (though they did not explicitly state that this would mean a republic). The Alliance 
idea of election among the Rulers for the top post would be ‘retrograde’ serving only the 
interests of the ‘ruling clique’ and ‘not compatible with present democratic trends in South-
East Asia.48  
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As discussed earlier, many groups, including in the Colonial Office, felt the British 
Crown should maintain a presence not only to protect the ‘Queen’s Chinese’ for example, but 
especially in the Straits Settlements, where no Malay ruler presided. Ideas included having the 
Queen represented in Penang and Malacca by a Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, who in turn 
would hold a position similar to Rulers in the states. The Federal monarch, it was suggested, 
would not only be Yang di-Pertuan Besar, but also Governor-General as in the Dominions. 
Even the high imperial title of Viceroy was mooted by the Colonial Office.49 The High 
Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillivray, while acknowledging that groups like the Chinese 
may prefer to keep the British Crown in some capacity in the Straits Settlements, overall felt 
this idea a dangerous one. Aside from the difficulty of finding a constitutional formula that 
would could work where the Queen would at one level share sovereignty with the Malay 
monarch at the centre, but also be subordinate at the state level, there would be major 
presentational and political concerns that would render the Queen as part of the Constitution 
of independent Malaya problematic. Malaya would become the first state to begin 
independence within the Commonwealth and not be a Dominion thus eschewing a 
constitutional place for the Queen. It was also the first indigenous and independent monarchy 
within the Commonwealth. MacGillivray believed however nominal the Crown’s role would 
be it would lay the charge that Britain was still engaged in colonialism and that the sovereignty 
of the state would be in question by being thought of as still being ‘governed’ by the British. 
Not only would there be speculation about British ‘intrigue and interfering’, but those Malays 
with ‘jealous nationalism’ would potentially recoil at the thought of a British Governor in 
Malacca since that area was ‘the seat of the original kingdom of the Malays’ and centre of 
symbolically pre-European Malay culture and history.50 The Reid Commission came to see 
this view too after meeting groups around the Federation. Indeed they supported this position 
despite senior officials on the Colonial Office saying explicitly that they ‘excluded’ the 
‘possibility of advising the Queen to cede her rights and abandon her sovereignty in the two 
Settlements’ and ‘hope[d] the Commission will seriously recommending this’.51 The Queen of 
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the Straits Settlement in post 1957 Malaya was to be in a position not unlike the residual 
constitutional extensions she maintained following independence in South Asia.52 
VI Rights for the Individual or Rights of the Community 
Malaya had always been a place where different cultures and communities lived. The Malayan 
Chinese leader Tan Cheng Lock and others saw themselves just as much ‘sons of the land’, as 
the Malays called themselves. For Tan Cheng Lock, for example, who traced his family’s roots 
in Malaya from 1771, he was a ‘true anak Malaka [ son of Malacca]’. This major political 
figure spoke of Malaya’s need to craft a moderate nationalism with democratic and ethnic 
unity. 
We in Malaya have adopted and want to apply the dynamic conception of nationalism and 
democracy. Nationalism, if it is to be unifying force, requires the elimination of communalism 
from political life. Democracy demands for it free operation an understanding of the 
conflicting claims of race and language and a willingness to compromise on major political 
issues after full and free discussion.53 
Tan Cheng Lock grew increasingly frustrated at the Chinese not being viewed as full 
and valued members of Malayan society. Nonetheless he recognised that only ‘when the 
Chinese acknowledge the same sovereigns as the Malays do, can they demonstrate their wish 
to the equals of the Malays’.54 This in some ways was discussed earlier and would see 
constitutional light. A proposal in 1949 began to emerge based on technical provision in the 
Nationality Bill of Johore whereby a subject of the ruler automatically became a federal citizen. 
Could this, it was suggested, see the Chinese included?55 At the time there were reservations, 
but the new state would see a new sense of loyalties and responsibilities emerge for all the 
political actors. The relationship between Malays and non-Malays lay at the heart of the 
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predicament of the Commission. The Malay leadership felt that their historic position 
warranted constitutional protection and promotion. 
UMNO in their memorandum produced the following guidance on the need for special 
‘privileges’ for Malays. 
While we accept that in independent Malaysia, all nationals should be accorded equal rights, 
privileges and opportunities and there must not be discrimination on grounds of race or creed, 
we recognize the fact that the Malays are the original sons of the soil and that they have a 
special position arising from this fact, and also by virtue of the treaties made between the 
British Government and the various sovereign Malay States. The Constitution should, 
therefore, provide that the Yang di-Pertuan Besar should have special responsibility of 
safeguarding the special position of the Malays. In pursuance of this, the Constitution should 
give him powers to reserve for Malays a reasonable proportion of lands, posts in the public 
service, permits to engage in business or trade, where such permits are restricted and 
controlled by law, Government scholarships and such similar privileges accorded by the 
Government; but in pursuance of his further responsibility of safeguarding legitimate interests 
of the other communities, the Constitution should also provide that any exercise of such 
powers should not in any infringe the legitimate interests of the other communities or 
adversely affect or diminish the rights and opportunities at present enjoyed by them.56  
Abdul Razak was questioned on the position of Malays in the future Constitution and 
the UMNO’s policy that the language and position of the Malays be protected. Reid was 
especially interested in how this would affect non-Malays. Razak replied that ‘We do not want 
to reduce the legitimate interests of the others. What we have in mind is not to give Malay 
special rights by taking away the legitimate rights of other people’. While Reid accepted this 
argument he pointedly qualified it by stating that ‘every additional privilege is, to some extent, 
prejudicing the others because it is limiting the amount of land or the number of jobs they could 
get and so on’.57 
Intentionally or not, mention of a ‘large alien population’ threatening the ‘interests of 
national unity’ was unlikely to find favour with the wider Chinese and Indian community 
across the Federation.58 On being pressed on why dual nationality was a problem for UMNO 
the Tunku stated that:  
For a new nation, it will be rather troublesome later. It is all right for an established or old 
nation; it can make all sorts of laws. But, at this moment, our main interest is to try and bring 
these people towards one common nationality and that is the reason why we have provided in 
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our terms of reference that that be a common loyalty, so that loyalty of the people shall not be 
divided. They shall be Malaya alone.59  
For these communities not only was recognition of their right to reside important, but 
also the right to publicly express their language. Language, of course, proved to be a major 
issue. Proposals to instil qualifications for Malayan nationality based on proficiency of English 
or Malay, which would in turn determine languages accepted in the legislature, raised concerns 
particularly among the Chinese community who feared that this would ‘mean depriving a large 
number of these Chinese nationals of the right to stand as candidates.’ Lord Reid’s response 
that the ‘Chinese are pretty able people’ who could learn English or Malay ‘pretty easily’ did 
not placate them. Justice Malik, however, with his experience of polyglot and republican 
India’s legislative acknowledgement and parliamentary procedure that recognised other 
languages beyond English and Hindi, which he argued could work in Malaya was more 
‘acceptable’ as well as understanding of the linguistic pluralism.60 UMNO appreciated this too 
and did not press a ‘Malay Only’ condition as their majority community Sinhalese counterparts 
were doing in Ceylon with the Sinhala Only Act that same year, which made Sinhalese the sole 
official language sowing the seeds for the ethnic conflict that would consume Sri Lanka.61  
Interestingly the Sinhalese and Tamil communities in Malaya submitted memoranda to 
the Commission, which argued for the special protection of their own languages and 
community. Perhaps the recent developments that very year in Sri Lanka that removed the 
Tamil language from being officially recognised throughout the country motivated the 
Malayan Tamil Pannai to record its service and history of the Tamil people in Malaya and 
passed on the resolution of its members that: 
The New Constitution of the Federation of Malaya should guarantee the preservation of the 
respective racial languages and cultures which is a cardinal right.62 
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The reality meant that as the Rulers’ counsel, Neil Lawson, put it ‘There is only one 
cake, and they all want a bit of it, and the bigger the slice of cake one has, the less is left to the 
others’.63  
VII A Malayan Eastminster 
As that early constitutional writer of independent Malaysia, RH Hickling, observed in 1991, 
the 1957 Constitution:  
sought to reflect the basic principles of a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. A 
Western lawyer reading that Constitution would suppose the reflection to be reasonably 
accurate; but further investigation would reveal that the reality is different from the 
appearance.64  
Malaya was set, and determined, to be an Eastminster. This entailed forging a state ‘that 
consciously had clear institutional and political resemblances to Britain’s system, but with 
cultural and constitutional deviations from Westminster’. 65 The Malaya Eastminster case 
would display the all five of the key ‘deviations’ that an Eastminster regime holds – having an 
indigenous political elite often educated in Britain; heads of states in the for form of Sultans 
that routinely interfered in political matters despite being constitutional non-executive heads; 
the legislature dominated by an overwhelming party in the Alliance with little parliamentary 
opposition and exclusive control of the executive; critical misgivings and issues regarding the 
rights of minority groups, especially vis-à-vis the privileged position of Malays; and finally 
critical continuities from the colonial period in the exercise of executive and emergency powers 
enabling the Tunku and his UMNO successors near unassailable authority over the state.66 
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Charles Parkinson contends that the ‘minimalist bill of rights in the Malayan 
independence constitution stands as a failed experiment in producing bespoke bills of rights in 
countries with minorities problems’.67 Nonetheless it was a considerable ‘innovation’ for 
English trained Commonwealth constitutional authorities like Jennings to recommend a Bill of 
Rights. Malaya was the first Colonial Office dependency to have a Bill of Rights, even though 
it was not the idea of the department. In common with many English legal scholars of the time 
Jennings saw bills of rights as restrictive and unnecessary devices. In 1952 Jennings provided 
a famous criticism of India’s constitutionally mandated fundamental rights.68 However, by the 
time Jennings joined the Reid Commission his opinion was changing, especially with the 
perspective of watching the collapse of his constitutional progeny in Ceylon and Pakistan. The 
Bill of Rights that became Malaya’s own, as Jennings acknowledged, was greatly influenced 
by Malik’s experience in India and Hamid’s in Pakistan, and perhaps spoke of Jennings’ own 
patchy record on the device.69 Jennings who had been constitutional adviser to the first Prime 
Minister of Ceylon and who effectively single-handedly framed that Constitution, was destined 
to witness, only a few years later, the failure of his broad non-discrimination clause in 
preventing the enactment of the Sinhala Only Act 1956, which made Sinhalese the sole official 
language and consequently catalysed ethnic riots.70  
In Pakistan where Jennings had been constitutional adviser to the Constituent Assembly 
and later to the Governor-General in the mid 1950s, arguably contributed to the ease with which 
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rights and democracy could be suspended.71 These experiences contributed to Jennings’ 
different approach in Malaya where he constructively framed a Bill of Rights that openly drew 
on India’s. Just prior to his death in 1965 he noted that his 1952 ‘criticisms were misconceived’ 
towards India’s Bill of Rights.72 While the Malayan Bill of Rights was not as strong as scholars 
such as Parkinson and Harding would understandably prefer it to be, it was nevertheless an 
improvement on Jennings’ previous attitude and approach. It was also an advance on 
contemporary legal mechanisms in practice across the British Empire and Commonwealth. 
This included open cross-Commonwealth borrowing from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, 
Ghana, South Africa, Newfoundland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland.73 
As Fernando argues, the publication of the Reid Commission’s report on 20 February 
1957 was greeted with attention surrounding the communal issues. Whereas, like many such 
experiences across the decolonising world, there ‘was hardly any public discussion of the 
structure and function of government, the powers of the executive, the independence of the 
judiciary the “limited” functions of the Conference of Rulers or the merits or demerits of the 
Federal concept outlined in the Reid Report’.74 The special status of Malays within the 
federation and Constitution was the issue that generated the most notice. For many Malays the 
Constitution needed to protect and promote their position and religion. While for the non-
Malays like the Chinese and Indian communities there was critical concern that their language 
and communities would be reduced to a second-class rank. The predicament, therefore, facing 
the Reid Commissioners was to balance, what for most of them was the uncomfortable 
objective of providing special privileges for Malays, with the need to still create a democracy 
that did not diminish the rights of non-Malays. Malaya’s constitutional history showed that at 
times, its constitutional development had been stunted under the British because of fears of 
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excessive centralisation at the cost of the state interests and potential increased power for non-
Malays.75 
Responsible government par excellence was contained within the Alliance 
memorandum and its presentation to the Commission.76 The preference for the flexibility an 
Eastminster provided was seen as a virtue. During the Alliance’s meeting in late 1956 with the 
Commission, the MCA representative Ng Ek Teong ended the meeting by stating he ‘wished 
the new Constitution be flexible as possible to encourage the growth of conventions’.77 In a 
characteristic utterance Lord Reid on hearing a proposal pronounced: ‘I would like to know 
how this would work because one does not want to recommend anything unless it can be 
worked’.78 
The left-leaning and multi-cultural Labour Party in its memorandum to the Commission 
advocated a traditional Westminster state arguing for an independent judiciary and civil 
service, bicameral legislature, popularly elected lower house and a ‘strong central government’. 
It even went so far as to recommend not only for Malaya the classic Westminster concept of 
parliamentary supremacy, but also wished to avoid, like the UK, the rigidities of a written 
constitution seen nowhere else in world bar New Zealand and Israel. Their recommendation 
on this issue bears repeating to illustrate the concerns and puzzles constitutional founding can 
evoke for those beyond the political and effective majority and, perhaps, lay out why 
constitutions are often discarded or replaced.  
The Labour Party does not believe that a written Constitution for Malaya at this juncture can 
be anything but a temporary measure. While recognizing that a Federal form of Government 
has the sanction and approval of those allied with State interests and of those who are at the 
moment in political ascendency, the Labour Party is of the opinion that a written Constitution 
must, to be effective in the flux of Malayan history, possess the elasticity and flexibility to 
meet the demands of economic developments, political progress and social change. A written 
Constitution must therefore be an instrument and a means for the building-up of a peaceful, 
progressive and democratic nation. To this end, the Labour Party cannot too strongly 
emphasise the need to avoid the rigidity that is characteristic of all written constitutions. The 
creators of a written constitution nearly always tend to obstruct, hamper, and restrict the 
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aspirations of future generations. The Labour Party therefore submits that in its present stage 
of development, Malaya should not be unduly subject to such constitutional fetters as a written 
Constitution must necessarily create.79 
The Reid Commission presented its report on 20 February 1957. The Colonial Office tried 
to see the report in advance, but the Commissioners insisted on their independence, which 
played to their reason of deliberating in, and then printing their report from Rome. The 
Commission also found themselves being criticised by the Colonial Office in their official 
response. Jennings was not impressed: 
The statement in paragraph 3 (of the White Paper) was at best maladroit, and in paragraph 53 
the writer tries to teach his grandmother to suck eggs. I have drafted too many constitutional 
documents to care two hoots; but it is most unfortunate that such statements should be made 
by Her Majesty’s Government about very distinguished lawyers in other parts of the 
Commonwealth.80 
Lord Reid insisted to the Press that the Commission was not the creature of His Majesty’s 
government, but jointly responsible to the Queen and Rulers:  
We have never consulted Whitehall. One reason that we are to meet in Rome to draft our 
report is to avoid the impression that we would consult the British government. It will be our 
report and nobody else’s.81  
The tripartite negotiations followed where representatives of the Alliance, the Rulers, 
and the High Commissioner met 23 times between 22 February and 27 April 1957. Once again 
it was the special position of the Malays and the prerogatives of the Rulers, which caused the 
most discussion. However, largely, while there was strengthening of Malay privileges and 
some attempts from members within the MCA and MIC to derail the process as well as 
elements of disapproval of the communal bargain in Britain, the Malayan Independence Bill 
went forward in the British Houses of Parliament unchanged and ready for the anointed day of 
31 August 1957.82 
VIII Conclusion  
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The Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, assured Reid, who was worried that people might 
blame him or the Commission for any shortcomings of the last version of the Constitution after 
being amended by the Alliance: 
If therefore anyone should feel that the final form of the Constitution falls short of perfection, 
responsibility for that lies not at the door of the legal draughtsmen but with the Malayans who, 
for political reasons, felt that they had to force the pace. But you will know as well as I do that 
I could not say that in public.83 
John Darwin argues that independence in 1957 caused ‘barely a ripple’ since through the 
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement of the same year the new government could call upon 
British military assistance against ‘internal subversion and external attack’. In addition, Malaya 
remained in the Sterling Area and agreed to maintain its commodities earnings in London’s 
dollar pool.84 Colonial rule continued in North Borneo and Sarawak, while Singapore remained 
a critical defence base for British interests. It was not so much the end of empire as a ‘new 
phase of cooperation’.85 Legally, the Privy Council remained a fixture in the Malaysian judicial 
hierarchy in part until 1985 despite, uniquely, not having the Queen as head of state. Harding 
believes that too much power was placed with the Executive and there were not enough 
innovations to deal with Malaya’s conditions and needs:  
Jurisprudentially, this all smacks of a rather too executive-minded approach, arguable and no 
doubt fashionable at a time when communist insurgency was an ever-present threat (British 
legal advisers agreed with the Alliance view); but in the light of international opinion at the 
time and subsequent developments in Malaysia and elsewhere in the Commonwealth, 
outmoded, discredited and unsatisfactory as a blueprint for government in the advanced and 
sophisticated society Malaysia was to become.86  
Whatever else, the demands on those tasked with the constitutional founding of the Malays 
were tremendous. The Tunku was critical to this founding and his faith in the British system. 
For Tunku Abdul Rahman the granting of an honorary doctorate in Law from Cambridge in 
1960 despite ‘scraping through’ with his degree as a young student many years before, was a 
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major honour for this man who nostalgically appreciated his time in Cambridge and his 
learning of English principles of law.87 Far from being just nostalgia this had a critical impact 
on Malaysia. HP Lee reflecting on 50 years of independence said that for Malaysia it was a 
‘blessing’ to have ‘a leader who obtained his legal education in the homeland of the common 
law, who imbibed notions of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the 
separation of powers’.88 Lee argues that in many ways:  
The lowering of the Union Jack and the raising of the flag of the new Federation 50 years ago 
on 31 August 1957 symbolised a change of constitutional order but not a change of that 
underpinning.89 
Turning to its founding, Jennings observed in hindsight that the work of this unique 
Commission showed ‘…that, in the opinion of five lawyers trained in five different 
environments, it was possible to produce an agreed solution of the constitutional problems of 
a complex country… Our scheme, being quite original, is constitutionally very interesting, and 
the only expert who has so far commented on it in my presence went so far as to call it 
“ingenious”’.90 This is debatable, but at the least it provided an extraordinarily influential 
Commission that framed the constitutional founding of the country, despite changes that the 
Alliance and later governments would make. As an editorial in the Manchester Guardian 
described after as Merdeka approached: 
Whatever the criticisms which will be made in Malaya during the next few days, the 
Constitution looks, in final shape, an ingenious document for bringing democracy to a plural 
society. The three main communities can at least see the possibilities of a tolerable life under 
the system now offered to them.91  
As with all constitutions, the true test would be if it worked in practice. 
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